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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NEW MEDIA: 
VIDEO GAMES AS PROTECTED SPEECH 
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR  
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Abstract: Over the past four decades, video games have evolved from the 
niche market of arcade halls to a multibillion dollar home entertainment 
industry. At the same time, video games also advanced technologically 
from relatively simple forms of entertainment to a rich medium capable of 
communicating ideas and information. This Note discusses the possibility 
that this new medium constitutes protected speech and the implications 
that protection may have on an individual’s right of publicity. First, the 
Note considers the precedent surrounding the validity of video games as 
protected speech. Beginning with the first cases on point that denied any 
First Amendment applicability, the Note then turns to more recent prece-
dent granting protection and examines the unsettled question about 
whether video games ought to be considered individually or categorically. 
Second, the Note reviews an individual’s right of publicity and the various 
tests used to balance it against free speech. In so doing, the Note con-
cludes that, while video games may deserve categorical protection, the 
term “video games” is too broad a definition; such a category would cloak 
some non-expressive games with the protections of the First Amendment 
at the expense of other individual liberties, like the right of publicity. 
Introduction 
 Films, music, and television are capable of delivering immersive, 
reality-escaping entertainment, and society has been using these media 
to deliver such experiences for decades.1 These forms of media convey 
themes, ideas, and information.2 In a word, they are capable of expres-
sion, and, as such, they are protected by the First Amendment.3 
 
1 See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (citing Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 
U.S. 546 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Doran v. Salem Inn, 
Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975)); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974); Schacht v. United 
States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970). 
2 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). In Winters v. New York, the U.S. Su-
preme Court established that entertainment media, so long as it is capable of expression, is 
protected under the First Amendment. Id. 
3 See id. 
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 In addition to art galleries, theatres, and music halls, highly im-
mersive, expressive experiences occur thousands of times a year in the 
comfort of living rooms through another medium: video games. For 
more than three decades, video games have been part of the enter-
tainment landscape, and what began as a niche community has grown 
into a multi-billion dollar industry.4 Today, sixty-seven percent of Amer-
ican households play video games.5 In fact, only a handful of enter-
tainment releases have ever eclipsed $1 billion in gross sales, and sitting 
alongside James Cameron’s Avatar and Titanic on that list are three vid-
eo games: Guitar Hero III; Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 ; and Call of Du-
ty: Black Ops.6 In addition to the economic growth of the industry, video 
games are gaining recognition for their artistic qualities by The Re-
cording Academy7 and the Smithsonian Institute.8 It was not until 
2001, however, in American Amusement Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick, that the 
                                                                                                                      
4 Entm’t Software Ass’n, 2010 Sales, Demographic and Usage Data: Essential 
Facts About the Computer and Video Game Industry 10–11, (2010), available at http:// 
www.theesa.com/facts/pdfs/ESA_Essential_Facts_2010.PDF. Between 1996 and 2009, video 
game industry revenues in the United States grew more than four hundred percent from 
$2.6 to $10.5 billion. Id. at 11. In 2009, worldwide industry totals are estimated at $46.5 bil-
lion. James Brightman, Games Software Business to Approach $65 Billion Worldwide by 2013, Says 
Strategy Analytics, IndustryGamers (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.industrygamers.com/news/ 
games-software-business-to-approach-65-billion-worldwide-by-2013-says-strategy-analytics. 
5 Entm’t Software Ass’n, supra note 4, at 2. Interestingly, for an industry thought to 
be dominated demographically by children and young adults, the average age of people 
who play games is thirty-five years old, and seventy-five percent of people that play video 
games are over eighteen years old. Id. This total includes the twenty-five percent of gamers 
who are over the age of fifty. Id. 
6 Press Release, Activision, Call of Duty: Black Ops Surpasses $1 Billion in Sales World-
wide (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://investor.activision.com/releasedetail.cfm?Release 
ID=538246; Daniel Terdiman, Modern Warfare 2 Joins ‘Avatar’ in Ultra-Elite $1 Billion Club, 
cnet News ( Jan. 13, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13772_3-10434464-52.html; All 
Time Box Office: Worldwide Grosses, Box Office Mojo, http://boxofficemojo.com/alltime/ 
world (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
7 See Geoffrey Boucher, Grammy Awards: Lady Antebellum, Arcade Fire Take Top Honors, 
L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 2011, http://theenvelope.latimes.com/awards/grammys/la-et-0214-
grammy-main-20110214,0,4003342.story. For the first time a Grammy went to a composi-
tion written for a video game: Christopher Tin’s “Baba Yetu,” which was named best in-
strumental recording. Id. 
8 See Michael McWhertor, The Art of Video Games Comes to the Smithsonian in 2012, Kotaku 
(Dec. 4, 2009, 6:20 PM), http://kotaku.com/#!5419173/the-art-of-video-games-comes- to-the- 
smithsonian-in-2012. In fact, the Smithsonian Institute invited the public to vote on their 
favorite art from video games for an exhibit at the American Art Museum. Randy Nelson, Vote 
on Games for Smithsonian’s ‘The Art of Video Games’ Exhibit, Joystiq (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www. 
joystiq.com/2011/02/14/vote-on-games-for-smithsonians-the-art-of-video-games-exhibit/. 
2011] Video Games, the First Amendment, and the Right of Publicity 619 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that some video 
games qualify as constitutionally protected speech.9 
                                                                                                                     
 Before Kendrick, courts grouped video games together with non-
expressive activities like pinball machines and chess;10 similar to these 
activities, the courts understood video games, as a medium, to be inca-
pable of conveying ideas or information to the user and therefore in-
capable of expression.11 Hence, video games were characterized as lei-
sure activities not protected by the First Amendment.12 
 The recent conception of some video games as constitutionally 
protected forms of expression significantly impacts public policy, mu-
nicipal ordinances regulating video games, and the availability of dif-
ferent tort actions.13 In particular, this development meaningfully af-
fects a person’s right of publicity because that right is often unavailable 
when the media in question is protected by the First Amendment.14 
 The right of publicity is a person’s right to control his or her own 
name, likeness, or identity and to prevent others from using the same 
for commercial use without consent.15 The right of publicity was first 
understood as an aspect of one’s right of privacy,16 but it was later rec-
ognized as a distinct cause of action.17 Eventually, in 1977, in Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the U.S. Supreme Court formally rec-
ognized the existence of a right of publicity.18 The Court acknowledged 
how that right was seemingly at odds with protections of free speech 
and therefore mandated that courts conduct a balancing test to decide 
which right should prevail in a particular case; the Court, however, did 
not specify what the balancing test should look like.19 Left with a clear 
 
9 See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick (Kendrick II ), 244 F.3d 572, 578 (7th 
Cir. 2001). 
10 See Am.’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, Dep’t of Bldgs., 536 F. 
Supp. 170, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
11 See id.; see also Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden, 382 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. 
Mass. 1983) (video games are incapable of expression); Caswell v. Licensing Comm’n, 444 
N.E.2d 922, 927 (Mass. 1983); City of Warren v. Walker, 354 N.W.2d 312, 316–17 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1984). 
12 See, e.g., Caswell, 444 N.E.2d at 925–26. 
13 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565–66 (1977); Am.’s Best 
Family Showplace, 536 F. Supp. at 174; see infra notes 178–221 and accompanying text. 
14 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565–66. 
15 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995). 
16 See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69, 79 (Ga. 1905) (recognizing 
that the “form and features of the plaintiff are his own”). 
17 See Haelen Labs., Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
18 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565–66. 
19 See id. at 574–75. 
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indication of a balancing test but no guidance as to what it consists of, 
lower courts have devised several variations over time.20 
 The right of publicity tort is of particular interest in the context of 
video games because games commonly use the likenesses of actors or 
athletes as characters, and this occasionally has been done without the 
individual’s permission.21 At least one recent U.S. district court decision, 
however, held that, despite the use of such a likeness, video games’ sta-
tus as protected speech prevents a successful right of publicity claim.22 
 This Note explores the history of video games as a protected form 
of expression, attempts to explain why certain games qualify for protec-
tion while others do not, and evaluates the possible implications an 
overly broad categorization of games could have on an individual’s right 
of publicity.23 Part I surveys the advancements in video games over the 
past thirty years, demonstrating in particular the ways in which the 
games have become more expressive.24 Part II reviews the First Amend-
ment and the protections it affords free speech in new media.25 The 
Part begins by briefly exploring the basic jurisprudence and reasoning 
surrounding free speech before turning to the history of its application, 
or lack thereof, to early video games.26 In so doing, the Part explores 
the initial rejection of video games as a medium capable of expression 
by reviewing the most significant cases of the early 1980s and how those 
cases lead up to the first serious consideration of video games as expres-
sion in the early 1990s.27 The Part then turns to the impact Kendrick had 
                                                                                                                      
20 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, and 
the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1345, 1355–64 (2009). Compare C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (us-
ing an ad hoc balancing test), with Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 
797, 808 (Cal. 2001) (establishing the transformative use test), and Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 
110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (establishing the predominant use test). 
21 See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 8, 2010).The Keller case was consolidated with another case in the same federal district 
court, O’Bannon v. NCAA, on January 15, 2010, and renamed In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
Name & Likeness Litigation. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litigation, 
No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 5644656, at *1, *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010) (denying certain 
plaintiffs’ motion to deconsolidate and referencing the January 15 order). 
22 See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
23 See infra notes 68–271 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 36–67 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 68–172 and accompanying text. For a similar discussion of First 
Amendment protections and video games, see Anthony Ventry III, Note, Application of the 
First Amendment to Violent and Nonviolent Video Games, 20 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1129, 1133–43 
(2004). 
26 See infra notes 68–112 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 89–124 and accompanying text. 
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by extending free speech protections to video games, several subsequent 
decisions, and ambiguities created by viewing games categorically.28 
 Part III of this Note describes a right particularly affected by the 
extension of First Amendment protection to video games—the right of 
publicity.29 First, the Part examines the history and development of the 
publicity tort.30 Second, it reviews the impact free speech protection has 
on the claim and the resulting balancing test required.31 Third, it sum-
marizes the most common versions of this balancing test used by courts 
in evaluating a claim under the right of publicity.32 The Part then briefly 
explains why the treatment of video games under the First Amendment 
impacts right of publicity claims.33 
 Finally, Part IV argues that the precedent concerning video games 
as protected speech is not necessarily dissonant and attempts to explain 
the disparity between how courts have evaluated games over time.34 In 
so doing, it explores what constitutes expression, why video games have 
recently qualified as expression, and the implications this has on the 
right of publicity.35 
I. A Quick History of Video Games: From Pong to Heavy Rain 
 The history of video games stretches back more than three dec-
ades.36 This Part describes the evolution of the medium, as understand-
ing what video games are capable of is paramount to evaluating their 
possible protection under the First Amendment—and as it turns out, 
there is more to this business than Nintendo.37 
                                                                                                                      
 
28 See infra notes 125–157 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 173–221 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 173–177 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 178–189 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 190–212 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 213–221 and accompanying text. For an analysis of how the right of 
publicity is affected by video games assuming video games are protected speech, see gen-
erally Christian Dennie, Tebow Drops Back to Pass: Videogames Have Crossed the Line, but Does 
the Right of Publicity Protect a Student-Athlete’s Likeness When Balanced Against the First Amend-
ment?, 62 Ark. L. Rev. 645 (2009). 
34 See infra notes 222–271 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 253–271 and accompanying text. 
36 See Entm’t Software Ass’n, supra note 4, at 2. Thirty-three percent of American 
households do not play video games. See id. 
37 See infra notes 38–67 and accompanying text. Although the brand name, Nintendo, is 
widely associated with video games, the video game industry dates back the early 1970s, and 
Nintendo did not become a significant company in the industry until the 1985 release of the 
Nintendo Entertainment System (NES). See ClassicGaming Museum: Atari 2600; 1977–1984, 
ClassicGaming, http://classicgaming.gamespy.com/View.php?view=ConsoleMuseum.Detail 
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 Video games are an interactive form of visual software meant, most 
commonly, as entertainment.38 In the early 1970s, video games started 
to appear in arcades, alongside pinball machines, as coin-operated 
standup boxes with built-in television screens mounted behind controls; 
the most successful of these early games was Pong, published by Atari, 
which was a digitized version of table tennis where users controlled one 
of two rectangles, or “paddles,” on the television screen in an attempt to 
deflect a bouncing square, or “ball.”39 The commercial success of Pong 
spurred the industry forward, and by 1980 several games, including 
Space Invaders,40 Asteroids,41 and Ms. Pac-Man42 ushered in what is com-
monly referred to as the “Golden Age” of video arcade games.43 
                                                                                                                     
 The objective of the vast majority of these early games was to ac-
cumulate as many points as possible and set “records” before losing the 
 
&id=8&game=4 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011); Company History, Nintendo, http://www.nin- 
tendo.com/corp/history.jsp (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
38 Oxford English Dictionary 614 (James A.H. Murray et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989). 
39 See The Videogame Hall of Fame: Pong (Inducted 2007), IGN Ent., http://games.ign. 
com/halloffame/pong.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). Pong is a two-dimensional sports 
game that simulates table tennis where the user controls one of two white paddles on a 
black screen, and either a second user or the computer controls the opposing paddle. 
Pong (Atari 1972). The user moves the paddle up or down along the left or right side of 
the screen, depending on which paddle is being controlled, and the object of the game is 
to earn points by deflecting a bouncing ball icon past the opponent’s paddle. Id. The play-
er with the most points wins. Id. 
40 Space Invaders (Midway 1978). Space Invaders, originally released in 1978, consists 
of the user controlling a space craft horizontally at the bottom of the screen and shooting 
a laser toward moving rows of enemies located at the top of the screen. The Videogame Hall 
of Fame: Space Invaders (Inducted 2007), IGN Ent., http://games.ign.com/halloffame/space-
invaders.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). The game was the first single-player game that 
gave players “lives” instead of limiting the game by a timer. Id. The lack of a timer and the 
fact that the game never ends allows users to compete for higher and higher scores. Id. 
41 Asteroids (Atari 1979). Asteroids, released in 1979, gives the user control of a trian-
gle space in the middle of free moving blocks, or asteroids. The Videogame Hall of Fame: 
Asteroids (Inducted 2008), IGN Ent., http://games.ign.com/halloffame/asteroids.html (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2011). Distinct from many of its contemporary games at the time, Asteroids 
does not use blocks of colors (known as sprites) to depict objects on the screen. Id. In-
stead, the game uses a technique called vector graphics that uses line drawings to create 
hollow shapes. Id. As opposed to Pong or Space Invaders, Asteroids also gives the user the 
ability to move his character anywhere on the screen. Id. 
42 Ms. Pac-Man (Midway 1981). Ms. Pac-Man, released in 1981, is a sequel to the 1980 
game Pac-Man. The Videogame Hall of Fame: Ms. Pac-Man (Inducted 2007), IGN Ent., http:// 
games.ign.com/halloffame/ms-pac-man.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). The game consists 
of maneuvering a yellow character through mazes collecting dots and fruit to acquire points 
while avoiding pursuing ghosts. Id. Like several other games of its time, the game does not 
have an end, but instead allows users to play as long as they have more lives. Id. 
43 Steven L. Kent, The Ultimate History of Video Games 116–22, 130–32, 167–73 
(2001). 
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game; to that end, these games placed the player in direct competition 
with other players and did not rely heavily on themes, plotlines, or even 
stories.44 This lack of narrative is most effectively evidenced by the fact 
that several of the most popular games were designed never to end, but 
rather allow a user to play indefinitely.45 
 As technology continued to advance, more complicated game ex-
periences became possible, and by the mid-1980s two significant innova-
tions in the industry were underway: home consoles and game genres.46 
A home video game console is a personal computer that most com-
monly attaches to a television set and is capable of operating software 
designed specifically for it.47 Early versions of home consoles included 
the Atari 260048 and Intellivision,49 but the most famous and successful 
home console was the Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) released 
in 1985.50 Selling over 60 million units worldwide,51 the NES popular-
                                                                                                                      
 
44 About Twin Galaxies International, Twin Galaxies Int’l, http://www.twingalaxies. 
com/php/about-us.php?idx= (last visited Mar. 20, 2011). Even after the popularity of early 
arcade and point-based games began to diminish, records for these early games continue to 
be sought by avid fans—an official record-keeping organization exists to this day. Id. The 
niche that still exists around classic arcade records was even strong enough to spawn a fea-
ture length documentary, centered on Steve Wiebe’s attempt to be recognized as having 
broken the world record for Donkey Kong, then held by Billy Mitchell. The King of Kong: A 
Fist Full of Quarters (New Line Cinema 2007). 
45 See supra notes 39–42. The combination of arcade fans seeking to break records and 
the perpetual nature of early arcade games revealed an interesting phenomenon known as 
“kill screens,” which suddenly end a game due to a glitch in a game’s programming when a 
user plays past what programmers conceived possible. See King of Kong, supra note 44. 
46 See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. Nintendo, among others such as SEGA 
and Atari, popularized the home console while advancing the technology. See infra notes 
48–52. Over the next decade, the Gameboy, Super Nintendo, and Sega Genesis would 
expand these innovations further. See infra notes 48–52. 
47 Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 38. 
48 ClassicGaming Museum: Atari 2600; 1977–1984, supra note 37. The Atari 2600 was one 
of the first home consoles and is credited with popularizing the home console market in 
1977. Id. It allowed owners to take several arcade classics home such as Pac-Man (Namco 
1980) and Space Invaders (Midway 1978), and most importantly it allowed owners to switch 
between games through the use of game cartridges. Id. As opposed to the multiple-button 
controllers later popularized by Nintendo and SEGA, the Atari 2600 was sold with a single-
button joy stick. Id. 
49 Released in 1979 as a direct competitor to the Atari 2600, the Intellivision was mar-
keted as a gaming console and computer. ClassicGaming Museum: Mattel Intellivision; 1980–
1984, ClassicGaming, http://classicgaming.gamespy.com/View.php?view=ConsoleMuseum. 
Detail&id=17&game=9 (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). It eventually spawned a few sequel systems, 
the Intellivision II and Intellivision III, but none competed with the success of the Atari or 
Nintendo systems. See id. 
50 See ClassicGaming Museum: Nintendo Entertainment System (NES); 1985–1995, Clas-
sicGaming, http://classicgaming.gamespy.com/View.php?view=ConsoleMuseum.Detail&id= 
26&game=5 (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). Following the economic crash of 1984, the NES was 
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ized the industry through mascots, television shows, commercials, maga-
zines, and even a feature-length movie.52 
 More importantly for the purposes of this Note, the NES also reju-
venated a video game industry beaten down after the economic collapse 
in 1984.53 Whereas earlier arcade games focused, almost exclusively, on 
short gaming experiences and earning points, the NES and other sub-
sequent home consoles were capable of storing larger games, producing 
more complicated music, and saving users’ progress.54 As such, many of 
the most popular NES games focused on stories forcing the user to pur-
sue goals to trigger plot elements and events.55 This is not to say that 
games without plotlines no longer existed; in fact, point-driven, arcade-
style games continued to thrive.56 Rather, the new technologies allowed 
game developers to diversify games beyond the traditional arcade style 
into genres such as role-playing,57 sports, and platforming.58 Not all of 
                                                                                                                      
 
released in the United States in 1985. Id. The console went on to outsell its competitors by a 
ten-to-one ratio. Id. 
51 See Nintendo Company History, supra note 37. 
52 See ClassicGaming Museum: Nintendo Entertainment System (NES); 1985–1995, supra note 
50. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Nintendo marketed its brand and mascots 
through almost every medium. Id. It published its own magazine, Nintendo Power, licensed 
its characters out for televisions shows including The Super Mario Bros. Super Show!, and 
made a film featuring its games, The Wizard. Id. 
53 See id. During 1983 and 1984, the video game industry experienced an economic 
decline that forced many publishers and developers to struggle. See Alexander L. Taylor III 
et al., Pac-Man Finally Meets His Match, Time, Dec. 20, 1982, at 62; ClassicGaming Museum: 
Nintendo Entertainment System (NES); 1985–1995, supra note 50. 
54 See The Videogame Hall of Fame: The Legend of Zelda (Inducted 2007), IGN Ent., http:// 
games.ign.com/halloffame/the-legend-of-zelda.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). There are 
several examples of NES games that represent innovations in size, technology, and music, 
but the best example would be The Legend of Zelda (Nintendo 1987). See id. Released in 
1987, the game was designed as an expansive world without a linear direction, featured 
multiple scores of music, and was the first NES game to feature a battery pack enabling 
users to save their progress and return to the game at a later time. See id. 
55 See id. 
56 See Lucas M. Thomas, Bubble Bobble Review: Now It Is the Beginning of a Fantastic Story! 
Let Us Make a Journey to the Cave of Monsters!, IGN Retro ( Jan. 8, 2008), http://retro.ign. 
com/articles/848/848223p1.html. Bubble Bobble, a popular game originally released in 
1988, features two dragons that blow bubbles to capture enemies. Id. The game is entirely 
points-driven. See id. 
57 See The Videogame Hall of Fame: Final Fantasy (Inducted 2007), IGN Ent., http://games. 
ign.com/halloffame/final-fantasy.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). Role-playing games rely 
heavily on story for appeal as opposed to fast-paced game play, and one of the first successful 
games of this type is Final Fantasy (Square 1990). See id. The genre uses storytelling, character 
development, music, and long pieces of dialogue. See, e.g., Final Fantasy (Square 1990). 
58 See, e.g., Super Mario Bros. (Nintendo 1985). Platform games are named after their 
core game mechanics, which involve jumping from one surface to another, and the most 
well-known game of this type is Super Mario Bros. (Nintendo 1985). See The Video Game Hall of 
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the genres were inherently focused on storylines, but for some, such as 
role-playing games, it was the genre’s defining feature.59 
 As the technology advanced throughout the 1990s to present day, 
this trend of diversification and increased capabilities dramatically im-
proved.60 The integration of compact discs (CDs) into home consoles in 
the mid-1990s, and the later integration of digital video discs (DVDs), 
exponentially increased the potential size of games and allowed for the 
use of live-action video, CD quality music, and computer graphic anima-
tions.61 Some games even spanned several CDs or DVDs in order to ac-
commodate the use of these innovations.62 In addition, home consoles 
steadily progressed in visual capabilities, moving from the two-
dimensional images of the NES to present day consoles capable of three-
dimensional characters with expressive facial features.63 
  Despite modern home video consoles being capable of nearly pho-
to-realistic images, not all games take advantage of these capabilities.64 In 
                                                                                                                      
 
Fame: Super Mario Bros. (Inducted 2007), IGN Ent., http://games.ign.com/halloffame/super- 
mario-bros.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
59 Compare The Videogame Hall of Fame: Final Fantasy (Inducted 2007), supra note 57, with 
The Video Game Hall of Fame: Super Mario Bros. (Inducted 2007), supra note 58. 
60 Compare The Legend of Zelda (Nintendo 1987), with The Legend of Zelda: The 
Ocarina of Time (Nintendo 1998). A good example of this progression is The Legend of 
Zelda series. See The Videogame Hall of Fame: The Legend of Zelda (Inducted 2007), supra note 
54. The original game, released in 1987, offered only two dimensions and limited dialogue 
to move the story forward. See id. In 1998, however, the technology of home consoles had 
progressed so that a game in the same series dealing with many of the same themes and 
characters, The Legend of Zelda: The Ocarina of Time, was three-dimensional, and utilized 
fully orchestrated music and in-depth dialogue. See id. 
61 See Business Development/Japan, Sony Computer Ent. Inc., http://www.scei.co.jp/ 
corporate/data/bizdatajpn_e.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). One of first successful home 
consoles using CD technology was the Sony PlayStation. Id. Originally planned as a part-
nership between Sony and Nintendo to develop a CD-based Nintendo console, the part-
nership unraveled and several developers moved their software to the new Sony console 
that was capable of higher storage capacities. See History of the PlayStation: The Greatest Story 
Ever Told, IGN Ent. (Aug. 27, 1998), http://psx.ign.com/articles/060/060188p1.html. 
62 See, e.g., Final Fantasy VII (Square 1997). Final Fantasy VII for the Sony PlayStation 
used four CDs in order to contain all of the sound and animation used in the game. See id.; 
see also The Making Of: Final Fantasy VII, Edge Mag., June 9, 2009, http://www.edge-online. 
com/magazine/the-making-of-final-fantasy-vii. As a more modern example, Final Fantasy XIII, 
released in March 2010, required the use of three DVDs. Final Fantasy XIII (Square-Enix 
2010). 
63 See, e.g., Heavy Rain (Sony Computer Entertainment 2010). An example of a game 
featuring near photo-realistic visuals and expressive facial features is Heavy Rain. See id. The 
game functions in many ways as an interactive movie, using character motivations and plot 
to create the entertainment. See id. 
64 See Emma Boyes, GDC ‘08: Are Casual Games the Future?, GameSpot UK (Feb. 18, 2008), 
http://uk.gamespot.com/news/6186207.html?tag=result;title;0; see, e.g., Bejeweled (PopCap 
Games 2001). Puzzle games, such as the very popular Bejeweled, use basic visuals but have a 
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fact, the popularity of the Nintendo Wii, iPhone, and Facebook demon-
strate the continued diversification of video games.65 Some games, often 
called “casual games,” focus on lightweight gaming experiences where 
the objective is often setting records or accumulating points.66 The genre 
of casual games is very similar to the arcade games of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, highlighting the fact that more primitive games continue to 
be produced regardless of advances in technology.67 
II. The First Amendment and Protection of Free Speech  
in Video Games 
A. The Evolution of Free Speech Jurisprudence Concerning New Forms of Media 
 Luckily for today’s society, the protections afforded to speech un-
der the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are not limited to 
the forms of expression in existence in 1789.68 Specifically, the First 
Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”69 This provision, more than any other, embodies 
the national commitment to the free exchange of ideas.70 “As a general 
matter, ‘the First Amendment means that government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or 
                                                                                                                      
large market share. See Mark Ward, Casual Games Make a Serious Impact, BBC News, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7301374.stm (last updated Mar. 18, 2008). 
65 See Bryon Acohido, Wii Wins Big Among Casual Gamers, USA Today, May 24, 2007, at 
2B; Anita Hamilton, Can the iPhone Rule Gaming?, Time.com, Aug. 4, 2008, http://www. 
time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1829037,00.html; Alexander Sliwinski, EA Signs 5 
Year Deal with Facebook, Joystiq (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.joystiq.com/2010/11/03/ea- 
signs-5-year-deal-with-facebook/. To date, Angry Birds, one of the most popular games on 
the iPhone, has sold over ten million copies. Richard Meads, Angry Birds Hits 10 Million 
Paid App Store Downloads, Pocket Gamer (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.pocketgamer.co.uk/ 
news.asp?c=9301957701&pk=89593147. Perhaps even more impressive, however, is the 
nearly fifty million monthly active users of FarmVille, a popular game on Facebook. See 
FarmVille, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/FarmVille (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
66 See Hamilton, supra note 65; see, e.g., Wii Sports (Nintendo 2006). 
67 See Acohido, supra note 65. It is also important to note that not only do new arcade-
style games continue to be produced, but remakes and re-releases of games from the 1980s 
continue to be published, perhaps the most popular example being Tetris (1989). Product 
Showcase, Tetris, http://www.tetris.com/products/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
68 See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65–66 (1981); Southeastern 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557–58 (1975); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 
161 (1974); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). 
69 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
70 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (quoting Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989)). 
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its content.’”71 In addition to the federal government, the various states 
are also subject to this prohibition through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.72 There are, however, limits to First 
Amendment protection.73 
 Over time, and as new forms of media developed, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that First Amendment protections extend beyond the 
printed and spoken word.74 For example, in 1952, the Court held that 
motion pictures are afforded free speech protection despite claims that 
the industry is a “large-scale business conducted for private profit.”75 
Additionally, live music,76 theatre,77 and even nude dancing are pro-
tected by the First Amendment.78 Today, the Court recognizes websites 
as possible sources of expression that may be protected.79 
 The Supreme Court has thus recognized that certain forms of en-
tertainment, as well as political speech, constitute expression deserving 
of protection under the First Amendment.80 To enjoy constitutional 
protection, however, entertainment must be designed to communicate 
or express some idea or information.81 Importantly, the Court does not 
require expression to have any “particularized message” in order to be 
constitutionally protected.82 This is because the line between informing 
and entertaining is frequently too elusive to act as the determining fac-
tor for First Amendment protections.83 
                                                                                                                      
71 See id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)). 
72 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
73 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (obscenity); Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (commercial speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting words); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) 
(clear and present danger). 
74 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 65–66; Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 557–58; Jenkins, 418 
U.S. at 161; Schacht, 398 U.S. at 63; Wilson, 343 U.S. at 502. 
75 See Wilson, 343 U.S. at 501; accord Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161. 
76 See Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 557–58. 
77 See Schacht, 398 U.S. at 63. 
78 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 65–66. 
79 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (striking down regulation of indecent ma-
terial on the Internet as an invalid content restriction of speech). But cf. Gridiron.com, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Football League Player’s Ass’n, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding 
that merchandise websites lack the expression necessary to qualify for protection). 
80 See Wilson, 343 U.S. at 501. 
81 See id.; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). 
82 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995). 
83 See Winters, 333 U.S. at 510. 
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 Nevertheless, courts sometimes feel comfortable drawing such a 
line and denying constitutional protection.84 Courts have held that ac-
tivities solely for personal pleasure and devoid of communication, such 
as bingo or blackjack, are not expressive entertainment and therefore 
do not qualify for protection.85 
B. History of Free Speech in Video Games 
 The federal and state court decisions on whether video games are 
able to express ideas and information such that they should be pro-
tected under the First Amendment were all decided without any direct 
Supreme Court precedent on the matter.86 Hence, lower courts were 
forced to rely on a principle articulated by the Supreme Court in the 
1975 case of Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad that “[e]ach medium 
of expression . . . must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by 
standards suited to it.”87 The result has been a shifting division in the 
jurisprudence.88 
1. Initial Rejection: A Denial of First Amendment Protection 
 A series of cases from the 1980s confronted the question of video 
games as protected speech when municipalities attempted to regulate 
them by ordinance like other forms of entertainment.89 These cases 
reviewed early iterations of video games and unanimously held that the 
format was incapable of expression and not protected.90 
 In 1982, in America’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York first estab-
                                                                                                                      
84 See There to Care, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Indiana Dep’t of Revenue, 19 F.3d 1165, 1167 
(7th Cir. 1994); Allendale Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1454 (D.R.I. 1985). 
85 See There to Care, 19 F.3d at 1167; Allendale Leasing, 614 F. Supp. at 1454. 
86 See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 958 n.11 (9th Cir. 
2009) (commenting on the lack of a Supreme Court stance), cert. granted sub nom. Schwar-
zenegger v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010); see also Wilson v. Midway 
Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179 (D. Conn. 2002). The issue is currently being con-
sidered by the Court. See Schwarzenegger, 130 S. Ct. at 2398. 
87 See 420 U.S. at 557. 
88 Compare Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick (Kendrick II ), 244 F.3d 572, 577–
78 (7th Cir. 2001), with Am.’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, Dep’t of 
Bldgs., 536 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). For a related view, see Ventry, supra note 25, 
at 1133–43. 
89 See Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden, 382 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Mass. 1983); 
Am.’s Best Family Showplace, 536 F. Supp. at 174; City of Warren v. Walker, 354 N.W.2d 312, 317 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984); City of St. Louis v. Kiely, 652 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
90 See Malden Amusement, 382 F. Supp. at 299; Am.’s Best Family Showplace, 536 F. Supp. at 
174; Walker, 354 N.W.2d at 316–17; Kiely, 652 S.W.2d at 697. 
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lished this interpretation, holding that video games communicate no 
element of information or idea.91 In Showplace, a restaurant owner in 
Queens wanted to install forty coin-operated video games in his estab-
lishment, but the city borough stopped the installation under a city or-
dinance that restricted video games in restaurants to no more than 
four.92 The restaurant owner sued claiming a violation of his First 
Amendment rights, and the district court examined whether video 
games constitute expression and are protected under the First Amend-
ment.93 The plaintiff argued that a video game is a fantasy experience 
similar to motion pictures and should enjoy similar First Amendment 
protection, and he used a Supreme Court case protecting coin-operated 
nude dancing for support.94 The district court distinguished the Su-
preme Court case by pointing out that the Court required some ele-
ment of information or some idea to be communicated before enter-
tainment would be afforded First Amendment protection.95 In so doing, 
the district court found that communicating information or an idea is a 
necessary element for video games to be protected as free speech, and 
without it, video games would fail the medium-specific test from South-
eastern Promotions.96 Specifically, the court stated: 
In no sense can it be said that video games are meant to in-
form. Rather, a video game, like a pinball game, a game of 
chess, or a game of baseball, is pure entertainment with no in-
formational element. That some of these games “talk” to the 
participant, play music, or have written instructions does not 
provide the missing element of “information.”97 
 Subsequent courts also used the reasoning from Showplace to deny 
video games protections under the First Amendment.98 In 1983, in 
Caswell v. Licensing Commission, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court confronted a similar issue when a video game arcade was denied 
                                                                                                                      
91 See 536 F. Supp. at 173. 
92 See id. at 171. 
93 See id. at 173. 
94 See id. (citing Schad, 452 U.S. at 62). 
95 See id. (citing Winters, 333 U.S. at 510). 
96 See id. at 173–74. 
97 See Am.’s Best Family Showplace, 536 F. Supp. at 174. 
98 See Malden Amusement Co., 382 F. Supp. at 299 (explicitly agreeing with the court in 
Showplace that video games are not protected by the First Amendment); Caswell v. Licens-
ing Comm’n, 444 N.E.2d 922, 927 (Mass. 1983) (no First Amendment protection for video 
games where license denied by city for automatic amusement devices); Walker, 354 N.W.2d 
at 316–17 (holding that ordinance restricting children under seventeen from playing video 
games did not violate the First Amendment). 
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a municipal license.99 Again, the court noted that First Amendment 
protections only attach to entertainment that is communicative of some 
idea or information.100 The court then compared video games to roller 
skating or recreational dancing insofar as they are activities not meant 
as expression but are rather for personal pleasure.101 
 Later that same year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
also heard Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town of Marshfield.102 The 
town of Marshfield enacted a complete ban on coin-operated amuse-
ment machines, including video games.103 The plaintiffs, seemingly 
aware of the decisions in Showplace and Caswell, argued that the games 
in question104 were sufficiently communicative as to merit protection as 
expression.105 The court rejected the argument and held that the 
games in question were, in essence, only technologically advanced pin-
ball machines and not protected by the First Amendment; this court 
was, however, the first to note the potential of video games as an ex-
pressive format.106 
 It was not until the early 1990s that a court, despite denying First 
Amendment constitutional protection, seriously considered the possi-
bility of expression in video games.107 In 1991, in Rothner v. City of Chi-
cago, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a city 
ordinance prohibiting minors from playing video games during school 
hours.108 The court, however, refused to hold that video games as a 
medium are incapable of expression.109 The court stated in dicta that it 
was unclear if video games are “simply modern day pinball machines or 
whether they are more sophisticated presentations involving storyline 
and plot that convey to the user a significant artistic message protected 
by the First Amendment.”110 The court ultimately upheld the ordi-
                                                                                                                      
99 444 N.E.2d at 923–24. 
100 See id. at 925. 
101 Id. at 925–26. 
102 450 N.E.2d 605, 606 (Mass. 1983). 
103 Id. at 606–07. 
104 The games included several mainstays of the early 1980s including: Ms. Pac-Man 
(Midway/Namco 1981), Tron (Midway 1982), Donkey Kong (Nintendo 1981), Zaxxon (Sega 
1982), and Kangaroo (Atari 1982). Id. at 609 n.5. 
105 See id. at 609. 
106 See id. at 609–10 (holding that the games on record lack protected expression but 
that “in the future video games which contain sufficient communicative and expressive 
elements may be created”). 
107 See Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1991). 
108 See id. at 298, 304. 
109 See id. at 303. 
110 See id. 
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nance on the grounds that, even assuming First Amendment protection 
for the video games, the city ordinance was a reasonable restriction on 
the time, place or manner of protected speech.111 Nonetheless, the de-
cision represented one of the first indications that at least some video 
games may qualify for protection.112 
2. Judge Posner’s Qualified Protection: The World of Kids’ Popular 
Culture “Is Not Lightly to Be Suppressed” 
 The shifting attitude towards video games as a form of expression 
began with Rothner, but it would be another decade before the answer 
to the question of their constitutional protection under the First 
Amendment was better articulated.113 In 2001, in American Amusement 
Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick, first the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana,114 and later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, held that at least some video games now qualify as consti-
tutional speech.115 
 In Kendrick, the manufacturers of video games and their trade as-
sociation sought to enjoin the enforcement of an Indianapolis ordi-
nance that limited minors’ access to video games that depicted vio-
lence.116 The district court considered the development process of 
video games at length, and concluded that video games are expression 
entitled to First Amendment protection if they include sufficient com-
municative, expressive, or informative elements to fall at least within 
the outer limits of constitutionally protected speech.117 The district 
court, however, denied the preliminary injunction on the grounds of 
obscenity.118 
 The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Posner, re-
versed the district court opinion and granted the preliminary injunc-
tion.119 In so doing, Judge Posner explored the idea of whether video 
games qualify as protected speech and held that the games at issue 
should be protected.120 To support its decision, the Seventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                      
111 See id. at 304. 
112 See id at 303; see also Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d at 609–10. 
113 See Kendrick II, 244 F.3d at 577–78. 
114 See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick (Kendrick I ), 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951–
52 (S.D. Ind. 2000), rev’d and remanded, Kendrick II, 244 F.3d 572. 
115 See Kendrick II, 244 F.3d at 577–78. 
116 Id. at 573. 
117 See Kendrick I, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 951–52. 
118 See id. at 981. 
119 Kendrick II, 244 F.3d at 579–80. 
120 See id. at 577–78, 579–80. 
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drew parallels between the themes communicated by the violent video 
games and themes communicated by violent literature such as the Odys-
sey and The Divine Comedy.121 Judge Posner wrote: 
Self-defense, protection of others, dread of the “undead,” 
fighting against overwhelming odds—these are all age-old 
themes of literature, and ones particularly appealing to the 
young. “The House of the Dead” is not distinguished litera-
ture. Neither, perhaps, is “The Night of the Living Dead,” 
George A. Romero’s famous zombie movie that was doubtless 
the inspiration for “The House of the Dead.” Some games, 
such as “Dungeons and Dragons,” have achieved cult status; al-
though it seems unlikely, some of these games, perhaps includ-
ing some that are as violent as those in the record, will become 
cultural icons. We are in the world of kids’ popular culture. 
But it is not lightly to be suppressed.122 
 Given the “literary character of the games in the record,” the Sev-
enth Circuit held that these games were protected by the First Amend-
ment; the court was careful to narrow its holding to the games on re-
cord, however, stating that “if the games lacked any story line and were 
merely animated shooting galleries, . . . a more narrowly drawn ordi-
nance might survive a constitutional challenge.”123 Hence, the court 
implied that video games must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, 
consistent with the principle articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Southeastern Promotions that each medium must be assessed for First 
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it.124 
3. Extending Protections, Interpreting Kendrick, and the Continuing 
Question of Which Video Games Are Protected 
 Following Kendrick, several other courts extended First Amend-
ment protections to video games.125 There is, however, an open-ended 
question as to whether the protection is controlled on a case-by-case 
                                                                                                                      
121 See id. at 577. The Seventh Circuit also compared the expression in the games to 
Ulysses and Great Expectations. Id. 
122 Id. at 577–78. 
123 See id. at 579–80. 
124 See id. 
125 See Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 958 n.11; Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis 
County (Interactive Digital II ), 329 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2003); Midway Games, 198 F. 
Supp. 2d at 181; Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 (D. Colo. 2002). 
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analysis of the games’ content or a bright-line standard for the medium 
as a whole.126 
 In 2002, in Wilson v. Midway Games, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Connecticut agreed with the Seventh Circuit that some, but 
not all, video games warrant protection.127 In Midway Games, the moth-
er of a murder victim alleged that a video game influenced her son’s 
murderer.128 The court, accepting the Kendrick case-by-case analysis, 
stated that “[video games] that are analytically indistinguishable from 
other protected media, such as motion pictures or books, which convey 
information or evoke emotions by imagery, are protected under the 
First Amendment.”129 After considering the qualities of the specific 
game in question, the court held that the game, as the plaintiff de-
scribed it, was protected First Amendment speech.130 
 Likewise, in 2002, in James v. Meow Media, Inc., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit cited both Kendrick and Midway Games in 
holding that the communicative aspects of video games are protected 
by the First Amendment.131 In Meow Media, similar to Midway Games, 
the parents of a murdered child claimed violent video games, movies, 
and websites desensitized the attacker.132 The Sixth Circuit implicitly 
adopted a case-by-case analysis of video games in holding that only the 
communicative portions of the specific video games presented by the 
defendants were protected by the First Amendment.133 Interestingly, 
the Sixth Circuit’s approach was more restrictive than the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s and the Connecticut federal district court’s, because it not only 
limited its consideration to the specific games in question but also only 
reviewed the portions of those games that communicated ideas.134 In 
fact, the Sixth Circuit went so far as to say that its decision “should not 
                                                                                                                      
126 See Ventry, supra note 25, at 1141. Compare Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 958 n.11, In-
teractive Digital II, 329 F.3d at 957, and Midway Games, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 181, with Interac-
tive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County (Interactive Digital I ), 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 
1134 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (rejecting a case-by-case analysis of any category of media, including 
video games), rev’d, Interactive Digital II, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003), and Sanders, 188 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1279 (implying that video games are categorically protected). 
127 See 198 F. Supp. 2d at 180–81. 
128 Id. at 169. 
129 Id. at 181. (citing Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(involving First Amendment protections for computer software)). 
130 Id. at 181. 
131 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572; Midway Games, 198 
F. Supp. 2d 167). 
132 Id. at 688. 
133 See id. at 696. 
134 See id. 
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be interpreted as a broad holding on the protected status of video 
games . . . .”135 
                                                                                                                     
 More recently, in 2009, in Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzeneg-
ger, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit assumed in its anal-
ysis that at least some video games are protected under the First 
Amendment.136 In Schwarzenegger, a professional video game association 
filed suit for declaratory judgment that a California state law restricting 
the sale or rental of violent video games to minors was invalid.137 The 
Ninth Circuit reviewed the law under the strict scrutiny standard re-
quired by the Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Ginsberg v. New York for 
content-based restrictions on speech.138 In so doing, the court noted 
that the defense did not even contest that video games are a form of 
expression protected by the First Amendment.139 The court went on to 
comment that “story-laden video games of the type potentially covered 
under the Act are similar to movies, which the [Supreme Court] has 
long held are protected expression not withstanding their ability to en-
tertain as well as inform.”140 The court implicitly followed the case-by-
case approach from Kendrick by identifying story-laden games as poten-
tially protected speech, thereby implying that other games, presumably 
non-story-laden ones, may not be covered.141 
 Conversely, some courts have used a categorical approach.142 For 
example, in 2002, in Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc., the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Colorado supported the Seventh Circuit’s 
conclusion in Kendrick, but seemingly held video games as a whole may 
be protected.143 In Sanders, the plaintiffs were the families of victims of 
the tragic school shootings at Columbine High School in Jefferson 
County, Colorado.144 Asserting multiple claims against, among others, 
members of the video game industry, the plaintiffs relied on the Show-
place line of cases as precedent to argue that video games were not pro-
tected speech.145 The court rejected that argument on grounds that 
subsequent cases, including Rothner and Kendrick, superseded Show-
 
135 Id. 
136 See Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 958 n.11. 
137 Id. at 952–53. 
138 Id. at 960–61 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636–37 (1968)). 
139 Id. at 958. 
140 Id. (citing Wilson, 343 U.S. at 501–02). 
141 See id. 
142 See Interactive Digital I, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1134; Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. 
143 See Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. 
144 Id. at 1268. 
145 Id. at 1279. 
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place.146 In so holding, the court extended First Amendment protection 
to video games stating that the plaintiffs “failed to show that video games 
deserve anything less than full First Amendment protection.”147 As op-
posed to Kendrick, it appears that the court did not limit this protection 
to the games involved in the case, but rather was making a statement 
about the medium in general.148 
 Perhaps no case epitomizes the case-by-case versus categorical de-
bate more than Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County.149 In 
Interactive Digital Software, a professional video game association chal-
lenged a local ordinance that made it illegal for a person to knowingly 
sell, rent, or make available graphically violent video games to mi-
nors.150 In 2002, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri upheld the ordinance on the grounds that the video games were 
not protected by the First Amendment because video games categori-
cally are not speech.151 In so finding, the district court expressly denied 
that some video games contain expression while others do not, stating 
that the First Amendment does not allow courts to review the content 
of books, magazines, motion pictures, or music to decide that some are 
speech and some are not.152 
 In 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, 
holding that the games in question were protected speech.153 The 
Eighth Circuit did little to resolve the larger constitutional issue, how-
ever, as it used conflicting language regarding whether video games 
should be considered categorically, as the lower court insisted, or on a 
case-by-case basis.154 At one point the court seemingly supported a cat-
egorical protection when it stated: 
If the first amendment is versatile enough to “shield [the] 
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or 
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll,” we see no reason why the 
pictures, graphic design, concept art, sounds, music, stories, 
                                                                                                                      
146 Id. 
147 See id. (emphasis added). 
148 See id. 
149 Compare Interactive Digital II, 329 F.3d at 957, with Interactive Digital I, 200 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1134. 
150 Interactive Digital I, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1129–30. 
151 Id. at 1141. 
152 Id. at 1134. 
153 Interactive Digital II, 329 F.3d at 960. 
154 See id. at 957. 
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and narrative present in video games are not entitled to a similar 
protection.155 
 A mere two sentences later, however, the court used language im-
plying a case-by-case analysis when it stated “that these ‘violent’ video 
games contain stories, imagery, ‘age-old themes of literature,’ and mes-
sages, ‘even an ‘ideology,’ just as books and movies do.”156 Therefore, 
though the court overturned the lower court decision and extended 
First Amendment protections to at least some video games, its inconsis-
tent articulation of its holding left its methodology unclear.157 
C. What Constitutes Expression? 
 To understand arguments for protecting video games categorically 
or on a fact-specific basis, it is first necessary to consider what factors 
might render video games “expressive.” The Supreme Court’s basic ap-
proach has been to ask (1) whether the speaker intends to communi-
cate a message; and (2) whether the speaker’s audience would under-
stand that he or she is communicating a message.158 Beyond this basic 
test, this Section discusses other factors that courts have employed in 
video game cases. 
 At least one court has considered the stage of production of the 
medium.159 In particular, the court stated that the conceptualization 
and work in the production of an item or activity, no matter how imag-
inative, does not alone qualify it as speech.160 The fact of the matter is 
that most, if not all, man-made things in the world are the result of 
some level of creative input, but not all are recognized as being able to 
communicate ideas qualifying them as constitutionally protected ex-
                                                                                                                      
155 See id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 
(1995)). 
156 See id. (emphasis added) (citing Kendrick II, 244 F.3d at 577–78). 
157 See id. 
158 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (“An intent to convey a par-
ticularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was 
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”). 
159 See Interactive Digital I, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1135 (stating that “background” expres-
sion does not make every automobile, gadget, or machine created a form of expression); 
cf. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410 (holding that the context in which a symbol is used for purposes 
of expression is important because the context may give meaning to the symbol). 
160 See Interactive Digital I, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1135. “[I]t is ‘possible to find some kernel 
of expression in almost every activity . . . but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the 
activity within the protection of the First Amendment.’” Id. (second alteration in original) 
(quoting City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)). 
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pression.161 For example, the production of an automobile involves 
teams of individuals, including artists, engineers, and graphic designers 
that make aesthetic decisions, but a car itself probably would not be 
considered a form of constitutionally protected speech.162 Similarly, the 
involvement of publishing companies, art departments, and program-
mers and their respective creative decisions during the production of a 
video game does not automatically render the game expressive.163 
 In addition, courts have stated that technological advancements in 
video games, while possibly important, do not, in themselves, qualify 
the medium as expression.164 For example, the activity of walking down 
the street is not considered expression;165 similarly, a video game simu-
lating the same experience, no matter how complicated the program-
ming or how hyper-realistic the visuals may be, is not likely to be con-
sidered any more expressive.166 It is possible, however, for technology to 
advance, and in so doing to make a medium capable of expression.167 
This fact is clearly recognized in the progression of precedent concern-
ing expression in video games.168 
 Finally, courts have noted that the fact that a medium is interac-
tive, rather than created by one speaker, does not necessarily remove it 
from the realm of expression.169 The most well-crafted literature and 
artwork are generally considered immersive and interactive insofar as 
they draw the viewer or reader into the experience.170 These works, 
however, are accepted as capable of expression.171 Courts have found it 
only logical to apply the same line of thought to other media, including 
video games.172 
                                                                                                                      
161 See id. (quoting Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25). 
162 See id. 
163 See id. 
164 See Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d at 609–10. 
165 See Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25. 
166 See Interactive Digital I, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1134; Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d at 609. 
167 See Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303. 
168 See Kendrick II, 244 F.3d at 577–78; Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303. 
169 See Interactive Digital II, 329 F.3d at 957. 
170 See id. 
171 See Kendrick II, 244 F.3d at 577–78. 
172 See Interactive Digital II, 329 F.3d at 957–58. 
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III. The Right of Publicity: Development and First Amendment 
Balancing Considerations 
A. Development of the Right of Publicity 
 The right of publicity is a person’s right to control his or her own 
name, likeness, or identity, and to prevent others from using the same 
for commercial use without consent.173 Although originally understood 
as an aspect of one’s right of privacy,174 the right of publicity was recog-
nized as a distinct right by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in 1953 in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.175 
In Haelan, the Second Circuit stated that “in addition to and independ-
ent of that right of privacy . . . a man has a right in the publicity value of 
his photograph . . . .”176 It would, however, be another quarter-century 
before the issue of publicity came before the Supreme Court.177 
B. The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment 
 In 1977, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the U.S. Su-
preme Court formally acknowledged the existence of a right of public-
ity.178 The Court acknowledged that the right was seemingly at odds 
with protections of free speech because likenesses are often used in 
works of expression, but it held that the plaintiff’s claim for violation of 
his right of publicity under Ohio law was not barred by the First 
Amendment.179 
 In Zacchini, the plaintiff was a performer of a “human cannonball” 
act.180 A local reporter, despite having been denied permission, re-
corded the plaintiff’s fifteen-second performance, and this video clip 
was later broadcast, in its entirety, on the defendant’s television news 
program.181 The Court distinguished the right of publicity from the 
                                                                                                                      
173 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995). 
174 See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68–69 (Ga. 1905) (recognizing 
that the “form and features of the plaintiff are his own”). 
175 See 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). In Haelan, the plaintiff, a chewing gum manu-
facturer, contracted with a baseball player for the exclusive right to use his picture, and the 
defendant, a rival chewing gum manufacturer, used a photograph of the baseball player 
without his consent. Id. at 867. 
176 Id. at 868. 
177 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565–66 (1977). 
178 See id. 
179 See id. at 578–79. 
180 See id. at 563. 
181 See id. at 563–64. 
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right of privacy and recognized it as a separate cause of action.182 The 
Court accordingly refused to use the actual malice test associated with 
right of privacy cases under Time, Inc. v. Hill.183 In its place, the Court 
used a balancing test to weigh the First Amendment’s free speech pro-
tections against a person’s right of publicity.184 The Court, however, pro-
vided no guidance as to how the balancing test should be applied and 
instead limited its analysis to the clear-cut example before it, stating that 
“[w]herever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between me-
dia reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure 
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media 
when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent.”185 
 Left with a clear indication of a balancing test but no guidance as 
to what it consists of, lower courts have devised several varying tests over 
time.186 To date there are at least three common versions of the balanc-
ing test to weigh free speech against a person’s right of publicity: (1) 
the Restatement approach;187(2) the transformative use test;188 (3) the 
predominant use test.189 
1. The Restatement Approach 
 The Third Restatement of Unfair Competition articulates an approach 
that divides confrontations between the right of publicity and expres-
sion into categories.190 For example, on the one hand, the use of a per-
                                                                                                                      
182 See id. at 573. 
183 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 571–72. The actual malice test is required to establish li-
bel/false light cases against public figures; it requires knowledge that the information was 
false or that it was published with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. See 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387 (1967). 
184 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–75. 
185 See id. 
186 See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 
808 (Cal. 2001); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003). For an in-depth 
discussion of the various balancing tests concerning the right of publicity, see Kwall, supra 
note 20, at 1355–64. For additional background information about the right of publicity, 
see generally Stephen R. Barnett, First Amendment Limits on the Right of Publicity, 30 Tort & 
Ins. L. J. 635 (1995); F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The “Transformativeness” 
Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a 
Work of Art, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1 (2003); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the 
Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DePaul-LCA J. Art. & Ent. L. 35 (1998). 
187 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. c (1995). 
188 See Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 808. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 903 (2003). 
189 See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374. 
190 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 (1995). 
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son’s name or identity for advertising or on merchandise is considered 
“for the purposes of trade” and unprotected, leaving it open to public-
ity liability.191 For uses in news, entertainment, and creative works, on 
the other hand, the Restatement asserts that the use of a person’s identity 
primarily for the purpose of communicating information or expressing 
ideas is not a violation of the right of publicity.192 The scope of the ac-
tivities allowed is broadly construed: 
[T]he use of a person’s name or likeness in news reporting, 
whether in newspapers, magazines, or broadcast news . . . use 
in entertainment and other creative works, including both fic-
tion and non-fiction . . . use as part of an article published in a 
fan magazine or in a feature story broadcast on an entertain-
ment program . . . dissemination of an unauthorized print or 
broadcast biography, [and use] of another’s identity in a nov-
el, play, or motion picture is also not ordinarily an infringe-
ment.”193 
 Use of a person’s name or likeness, however, is not permissible if it 
is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the 
identified person.194 
2. The Transformative Use Test 
 The transformative use test weighs First Amendment protections 
for expression against a person’s right of publicity by determining 
“whether the [person’s] likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from 
which an original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imi-
tation of the [person] is the very sum and substance of the work in 
question.”195 If the former is true, the work is most likely protected ex-
pression; if the latter is true, the work is less likely to be protected 
speech and is more likely to be subject to liability under a publicity 
claim.196 
 In 2001, in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., the Su-
preme Court of California first articulated what would come to be 
known as the transformative use test.197 The plaintiff was the owner of 
                                                                                                                      
191 See id. § 47 cmts. a, b. 
192 See id. cmt. c. 
193 See id. 
194 See id.; Kwall, supra note 20, at 1360–61. 
195 See Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 809. 
196 See id. at 809, 811; Kwall supra note 20, at 1357–58. 
197 See 21 P.3d at 808. 
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all rights associated with the comedy act known as “The Three Stoog-
es,” and was seeking damages and injunctive relief for the reproduction 
and sale of charcoal drawings and lithographs using a likeness of The 
Three Stooges.198 In an effort to affect the balancing test required in 
Zacchini, the court imported a piece of the fair use doctrine from copy-
right law to determine whether the drawings and lithographs were pro-
tected by the First Amendment.199 As such, the court inquired into 
whether a work is “transformative” by asking “whether the new work 
merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation [citations], or 
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different char-
acter, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”200 
 Through its test, the court recognized that on the one hand “when 
artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction . . . for commer-
cial gain, directly trespassing on the right of publicity without adding 
significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law interest in pro-
tecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of 
the imitative artist.”201 On the other hand, “when a work contains sig-
nificant transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First 
Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the 
economic interest protected by the right of publicity.”202 
3. The Predominant Use Test 
 The predominant use test, rather than focusing on expression, 
looks at the product being sold and whether it predominantly exploits 
the commercial value of an individual’s identity.203 In such circum-
stances, under this test, the product is held to violate the right of pub-
licity and is not protected by the First Amendment, even if there is 
some expressive content.204 As opposed to the other tests, the pre-
dominant use test gives greater weight to the fact that “many uses of a 
person’s name and identity have both expressive and commercial com-
ponents.”205 
                                                                                                                      
198 See id. at 800. 
199 See id. at 807–08. The court, however, specifically avoided a “wholesale importation 
of the fair use doctrine,” because it stated at least two of the factors employed in the fair 
use test did not seem especially useful for determining whether the depiction of a person’s 
likeness is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 808. 
200 See id. (alteration in original). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374; Kwall, supra note 20, at 1359. 
204 See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374. 
205 See id. 
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 In 2003, in Doe v. TCI Cablevision, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
developed the predominant use test.206 In TCI Cablevision, Anthony 
“Tony” Twist, a former professional hockey player, sued Todd McFar-
lane, the creator of the Spawn comic series, for the improper use of his 
name and likeness for a character in the comic named “Tony Twist.”207 
The real Tony Twist was renowned during his career for his aggressive, 
violent play, becoming the league’s preeminent “enforcer” —a player 
whose chief responsibility was to protect teammates from physical as-
saults by opponents.208 Todd McFarlane, an avowed hockey fan, named 
a mafia don in his comic series “Anthony ‘Tony Twist’ Twisteli.”209 The 
court recognized that the real and fictional Tony Twists bear no physi-
cal resemblance to each other and aside from the common nickname, 
are similar only in that each can be characterized as having an “en-
forcer” or tough-guy persona.210 
 Despite this, the court held in favor of the plaintiff stating that “the 
use and identity of Twist’s name has become predominantly a ploy to 
sell comic books and related products rather than an artistic or literary 
expression, and under these circumstances, free speech must give way 
to the right of publicity.”211 On remand, the jury awarded Twist $15 
million in damages, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed.212 
                                                                                                                     
C. The Intersection: The First Amendment and the Right of Publicity 
Concerning Video Games 
 In the spring of 2009, Samuel Keller, an ex-college athlete, filed a 
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia.213 In his complaint, Keller alleged, among other things, a viola-
tion of his right of publicity for the use of his name and likeness in the 
Electronic Arts (EA) video game series, NCAA Football.214 In addition, 
the complaint sought class action status alleging common violations to 
 
206 See id. 
207 See id. at 365. 
208 See id. at 366. 
209 See id. 
210 See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 366. 
211 See id. at 374. 
212 See Doe v. McFarland, 207 S.W.3d 52, 56, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
213 See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 
WL 5644656, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010). 
214 See Class Action Complaint at 10, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-1967, 2010 WL 
530108 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009). For an in-depth analysis of the publicity claim in Keller, see 
Anastasios Kaburakis et al., NCAA Student-Athletes’ Rights of Publicity, EA Sports, and the Video 
Game Industry, Ent. & Sports Law., Summer 2009, at 1, 20–30. 
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the rights of publicity for all NCAA football and basketball players listed 
on the official opening day roster of a school whose team was included 
in any interactive software produced by EA.215 This case represents an 
intersection between the freedom of speech and the right of publicity 
insofar as it will require a determination of the status of video games as 
protected speech, whether this game in particular is protected,216 and 
whether the alleged use of the plaintiff’s likeness constitutes a violation 
of the right of publicity.217 
 To that extent, Samuel Keller’s case is similar to a 2007 case, C.B.C. 
Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball.218 In C.B.C. Distri-
bution, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the 
use of baseball statistics and player names for the purpose of fantasy 
baseball products was protected speech similar to Interactive Digital, 
mandating a balancing test under Zacchini.219 The court, using an ad 
hoc balancing test, determined that publicity rights of the professional 
baseball players were outweighed by free speech protections because, 
among other things, the state’s interest in protecting publicity rights is 
diminished by the fact that professional athletes are already hand-
somely compensated.220 This factor, however, is distinctively absent 
from Keller because NCAA athletes are prohibited from using their 
likenesses for profit.221 
IV. The Risks and Implications of Categorically Protecting 
“Video Games” Without Specifically Defining the Medium 
 The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes certain forms of enter-
tainment may qualify as protected expression under the First 
Amendment.222 Specifically, to enjoy constitutional protection, an 
entertainment medium must be designed to communicate or ex-
press some idea or information,223 even if there is no “particularized 
                                                                                                                      
 
215 See id. at 15. 
216 See generally Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County (Interactive Digital 
II ), 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003). 
217 See Dennie, supra note 33, at 657–76. See generally C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d 818; 
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218 See C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 823–24. 
219 See id. at 823. 
220 See id. at 824. 
221 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 214, at 4. 
222 See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). 
223 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); see also Schad v. Borough of 
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 
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message.”224 Hence, video games must be capable of expression to 
be protected by the First Amendment, but courts have wrestled with 
whether to consider the medium categorically or on a case-by-case 
basis.225 If video games follow other forms of media in eventually 
finding categorical protection, how the category is defined is para-
mount: this Part argues that a broad definition of “video games” 
risks encapsulating both expressive and non-expressive forms of en-
tertainment, cloaking both in constitutional protections to the po-
tential detriment of other individual liberties, like the right of pub-
licity.226 
A. Why Kendrick Is Consistent with Showplace: An Argument Against a 
Broad Category of “Video Games” 
 Recent case law provides no clear indication of whether video 
games are considered to be categorically protected under the First 
Amendment or only individually eligible for protection on a case-by-
case basis.227 Contrary to the way other media are evaluated,228 most 
jurisdictions appear to pass judgment on only the video games involved 
in a particular case rather than consider the medium as a whole. 
 In fact, the main argument against a fact-specific application of 
First Amendment protections for video games is that other forms of 
protected media are not dissected based on content.229 For example, 
motion pictures,230 live music,231 and theatre232 all are considered cate-
gorically protected expression, subject to narrow exceptions.233 Again, 
even adult entertainment benefits from the presumption of expres-
                                                                                                                      
210–12 (1975); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557–58 (1975); 
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970). 
224 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995). 
225 See supra notes 68–172 and accompanying text. 
226 See infra notes 227–271 and accompanying text. 
227 See Ventry, supra note 25, at 1148. 
228 See Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County (Interactive Digital I ), 200 F. 
Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (rejecting a case-by-case analysis of any category of 
media, including video games), rev’d, Interactive Digital II, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003). 
229 See Interactive Digital I, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. 
230 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952); see also Jenkins v. 
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974). 
231 See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557–58 (1975). 
232 See Schacht, 398 U.S. at 63. 
233 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (obscenity); Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (commercial speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (fighting words); Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) 
(clear and present danger); supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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sion.234 This is likely because courts are uncomfortable becoming the 
interpreters of what content warrants constitutional protection, and are 
instead more comfortable evaluating whether a delivery mechanism is 
capable of conveying ideas.235 Given this tradition, it would seem only 
natural for courts to consider video games as a whole and to determine 
the medium’s fate categorically.236 
 To evaluate video games as one broad category, however, would be 
a misguided attempt to lump apples with oranges.237 The diverse array 
of video games available today simply does not comprise a comprehen-
sive category.238 This is not to say, however, that the categorical ap-
proach must be abandoned altogether.239 Rather, the categorical ap-
proach simply needs to be modified, as the previously conceived 
category has been drawn too broadly.240 What has collectively been un-
derstood as “video games” is actually a collection of several different 
media built with similar tools but with different applications and capa-
bilities; these media must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by 
standards suited to each of them.241 To make an obvious point, consider 
for a moment the difference between a marble curb on the side of a 
street and Michelangelo’s David. From a disinterested standpoint, both 
the curb and David are made of the same material and were conceptual-
ized by individuals who made aesthetic choices; it is clear, however, that 
                                                                                                                      
234 See Schad, 452 U.S. at 72. 
235 See Winters, 333 U.S. at 510; Interactive Digital I, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. 
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games?” See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 
No. 08-1448 (U.S. argued Nov. 2, 2010). 
241 See Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 557; supra notes 35–67 and accompanying 
text. 
646 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:617 
one is expressive in that it conveys ideas and the other is utilitarian. A 
similar mistaken categorization is apparent when one looks at the case 
law summarized in this Note as concerning a single medium.242 Simply 
put, some games are made to be expressive, such as story-laden games, 
while others, such as arcade games, are utilitarian products meant as 
simple leisure activities.243 To carry the metaphor forward, the mistake 
being made by courts and scholars when they argue for or against cate-
gorical protection of all video games is that they are grouping the curb 
and David together and trying to evaluate the capabilities of marble.244 
.248 
                                                                                                                     
 This becomes apparent when, instead of viewing the case law as 
evolving toward a new interpretation of video games as a whole, one 
views the cases as evaluations of different categories.245 Understood in 
this way, the decisions dating from the early 1980s are not unenlight-
ened just because modern courts are beginning to reach different con-
clusions; instead, the early courts were evaluating fundamentally differ-
ent products, namely arcade-style video games similar to pinball or 
chess, neither of which are considered protected forms of speech.246 
On the other hand, the more recent cases have evaluated a more intri-
cate, distinct category of games that involve themes, characters, and 
storylines.247 Hence, the modern courts found these works more simi-
lar to literature and movies than to games like chess, and therefore 
more deserving of constitutional protection
 These analyses are therefore not mutually exclusive because the 
courts were evaluating entirely different categories of video games.249 
Importantly, once one arrives at this understanding, one sees that the 
case law does not run contrary to either the Supreme Court’s 1975 deci-
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sion in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad or the traditional approach 
of assigning constitutional protections for expression categorically by 
medium; instead the arcade games and story-laden games are not in the 
same category or medium, and need to be evaluated by methods suited 
to them.250 This distinction has continued relevance because, despite 
the advancements in video games that make them capable of expression 
and deserving of constitutional protection, there are games made today 
that are still just digital iterations of real life or activities devoid of ex-
pression similar to those evaluated by the courts in the 1980s.251 As such, 
it would be inappropriate to designate all video games as expression 
when some games simply do not convey ideas or information.252 
B. Implications for the Right of Publicity: Protecting Non-Expressive Work with 
an Overly Broad Categorization 
 An overly broad categorical protection for “video games” under 
the First Amendment not only runs counter to Supreme Court prece-
dent but would also have significant implications for other rights, in-
cluding one’s right of publicity.253 The balancing test required by the 
Court in the 1977 case of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. is 
meant to evaluate free speech protections against the rights of an indi-
vidual to protect his own image.254 As such, it would be inappropriate 
to require such a high hurdle if the video game in question is just an 
arcade-style game not capable of expression but nonetheless protected 
because of an overly broad categorical determination; such a situation 
would result in an over-inclusive constitutional protection that would 
intrude on the rights of individuals, including their right of publicity.255 
 The importance of this implication becomes even more evident 
when the various balancing tests developed after Zacchini are consid-
ered.256 Given the fact that video games, by their nature, are a compli-
cated, interactive media, it is highly unlikely that the use of an individ-
ual’s likeness in a video game would fail to be protected as speech by 
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any of the three tests discussed above, the most lenient being the pre-
dominant use test.257 
 For example, consider Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., where a college 
quarterback’s likeness is used in the video game NCAA Football.258 Un-
der the Restatement approach, the use of an individual’s identity is not a 
violation of the right of publicity if it is used in news, entertainment, or 
creative works for the purpose of communicating information or ex-
pressing ideas.259 If an overly broad definition of video games is cate-
gorically protected as expression regardless of whether the game is an 
arcade-style or a story-laden game, there would be a built-in assumption 
of communication of information.260 Therefore, use of the person’s 
identity would likely be protected.261 
 A similar result is likely under the transformative use test.262 The 
transformative use test weighs constitutionally protected expression 
against a person’s right of publicity by determining if an individual’s 
identity is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is syn-
thesized, or if the depiction is the very sum and substance of the work 
in question.263 Again, it is unlikely that a court would hold that the use 
of an individual’s identity, or even the identity of the sought class in Kel-
ler, amounts to the entire sum and substance of the work in question.264 
Video games, as opposed to the artwork in Comedy III, are complicated 
syntheses of programming and art design that make any one element 
less likely to be the entire sum of the work, let alone the use of a single 
identity.265 
 The predominant use test may be the only avenue to overcome an 
over-inclusive, categorical protection.266 This test looks at the product 
being sold and whether it predominantly exploits the commercial value 
of an individual’s identity; if it does the product is held to violate the 
right of publicity even if there is some expressive content.267 In a situa-
tion like Keller, a court may be able to overcome a categorical presump-
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tion that all video games constitute expression because, as opposed to 
the other tests, it gives greater weight to the fact that many uses of a 
person’s identity have both expressive and commercial components.268 
Hence, it may be possible, if unlikely, to view the use of a single identity 
as inappropriately contributing to a work despite the expressive nature 
of the product.269 
 Prescribing categorical protection to an overly broad definition of 
video games inappropriately forces right of publicity claims involving all 
games into the balancing test meant to weigh constitutionally protected 
expression against an individual’s ability to control his own identity.270 
To do so, despite the fact that it is clear that at least some video games 
are incapable of conveying ideas and are not expression, extends the 
constitutional protection too far.271 
Conclusion 
 The recent extension of constitutional protection to video games is 
recognition that the medium is capable of expression, and it is a neces-
sary extension as the industry continues to grow into one of the largest 
elements of entertainment media.272 Nevertheless, it is necessary not to 
overextend such protections and risk potentially infringing on other 
rights. Video games are no longer all mindless entertainment activities 
aimed at accruing points. Many of today’s video games have in-depth 
storylines and themes. These cinematic experiences are capable of ex-
pression and are certainly worthy of constitutional protection. At the 
same time, it is necessary to not overextend such protections to include 
games that are neither meant as expression, nor capable of it. Despite 
the advent of complicated games that convey themes, character devel-
opment, and emotion, there will always be games that are modern-day 
equivalents of Pong and Asteroids—leisure activities undeserving of con-
stitutional protection. The recent popularity in casual and online 
games, such as Bejeweled, Angry Birds, and FarmVille, demonstrates that 
these games are very much still in demand. Thus, a medium like video 
games, if too broadly defined, can encompass massively different works, 
and can create the potential for infringement upon personal liberties. 
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 In the end, though it is important to protect new media capable of 
expression, game publishers should not be able to hide behind the 
guise of expression to secure constitutional First Amendment protec-
tion if their particular work is not capable of expression. 
Neil G. Hood 
